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“I’LL SEE”: HOW SURVEILLANCE UNDERMINES 
PRIVACY BY ERODING TRUST 
Robert H. Sloan† and Richard Warner††
Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog argue persuasively that 
“modern privacy law is incomplete because from its inception it has 
failed to account for the importance of trust.” We address the open 
question of how privacy law should “account for the importance of 
trust.” We combine the focus on trust with another theme: the 
dehumanizing effect of surveillance. As the security expert Bruce 
Schneier notes, “psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, novelists, 
and technologists have all written about the effects of constant 
surveillance. . . . It threatens our very selves as individuals. It’s a 
dehumanizing tactic employed in prisons and detention camps.” We 
address the open question of why (and under what conditions) it does 
so. The link between the loss of trust and the dehumanizing effects of 
surveillance not only makes a compelling case that privacy law 
should preserve trust and prevent dehumanization, but also suggests 
how it can do so. 
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INTRODUCTION
In Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago manipulates Othello into 
worrying that his wife, Desdemona, may be unfaithful. In response, 
Othello declares, 
I’ll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove; 
And on the proof, there is no more but this, 
—Away at once with love or jealousy!1
Othello’s plan is to suspend judgment until he collects enough data to 
“see” whether Desdemona is faithful. The irony is that his “I’ll see” 
changes what he sees. Before, Desdemona was his “soul’s joy,”2 and 
he trusted her to be faithful. His “I’ll see” suspends that trust and 
leads him to brush aside her professions of love as lies. In addition, 
and importantly for our purposes, the “I’ll see” destroys Desdemona’s 
trust in Othello.3
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO (Stephen Orgel & Russ Mcdonald eds., 2001), act 
3, sc. 3. 
2. Id. at act 2, sc. 1. 
3. See, e.g., Shakespeare, supra note 1, act 4, sc. 2, where Desdemona remarks, 
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Contemporary surveillance has the same “I’ll see” plan as 
Othello. Or, better a similar plan. The analogy is far from perfect. 
Othello both conducts the surveillance and interacts with Desdemona 
as husband and wife. Businesses and governments are nonetheless 
importantly like Othello: they collect data to see what people are like 
in order to treat them accordingly.4 We are concerned with the effects 
on individuals who, like Desdemona, do not conduct that surveillance 
themselves.5 The Othello analogy, while imperfect, is still enough on 
point to sharply pose the question of whether surveillance undermines 
trust among individuals who live their lives under a pervasive 
investigative gaze. 
The question is as neglected as it is important. As Neil Richards 
and Woodrow Hartzog persuasively argue, “modern privacy law is 
incomplete because from its inception it has failed to account for the 
importance of trust.”6 We combine our consideration of trust with 
another urgent concern: the threat pervasive surveillance poses to the 
self. As many have argued, “To the extent we risk the loss of privacy 
we risk, in a very real sense, the loss of our very status as subjective, 
autonomous persons.”7
I have none [no husband]. Do not talk to me, Emilia. 
I cannot weep, nor answers have I none 
But what should go by water [be expressed in tears]. 
 4. JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL: HOW WE ARE SACRIFICING A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE 14 (2007). Rule notes that modern 
surveillance practices share a distinctive and sociologically crucial quality:  “they not only 
collect and record details of personal information; they are also organized to provide bases for 
action toward the people concerned.” (emphasis in original) Systematically harvested personal 
information, in other words, furnishes bases for institutions to determine what treatment to mete 
out to each individual. Id.
 5. We note in passing that, in contemporary surveillance, the watcher is indeed also 
often the watched. As Jeffery Rosen notes, “[t]he sociologist Thomas Mathiesen has contrasted 
Michel Foucault’s Panopticon—a surveillance house in which the few watched the many—with 
what he calls the “Synopticon” created by modern television, in which the many watch the few. 
But in the age of the Internet, we are experiencing something that might be called the 
“Omnipticon,” in which the many are watching the many, even though no one knows precisely 
who is watching or being watched at any given time.” JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD:
RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 11 (2005). We focus however on 
business and government surveillance in which the people surveilled are not also conducting the 
surveillance.
 6. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, ___ 
STANF. TECH. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2017). 
 7. Michael P. Lynch, PRIVACY AND THE THREAT TO THE SELF THE N.Y. TIMES  (June 
22, 2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/privacy-and-the-threat-to-the-self/.
See also BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 127 (2015). The connection between privacy and the self is 
a standard theme in the privacy literature. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
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The link among trust, surveillance, and the self is the concept of 
privacy in public.8 This concept dates back at least to the nineteenth 
century sociologist Georg Simmel, who observed that people 
voluntarily limit their knowledge of each other as they interact in a 
wide variety of roles.9 Thus, certain information remains private
relative to the interaction even if it is readily publicly available to 
others in other contexts. The link to the self lies in the fact that 
[a]t its core, managing privacy is about managing relationships 
between the self and others. . . privacy [is] a “boundary regulatory 
process by which a person (or group) makes himself more or less 
accessible and open to others.” When we regulate our accessibility 
to others—including the accessibility of information, objects, 
space, time, or anything else that we deem private—we 
simultaneously regulate our relationships with them.10
We argue that adequate self-realization requires adequately 
“managing relationships between the self and others.” That is possible 
only when people can trust each other to voluntarily limit their 
knowledge of each other. Surveillance, we contend, erodes trust 
thereby undermining privacy in public and consequently limiting 
possibilities for self-realization. This framework allows us to make a 
compelling case for privacy law to intervene to preserve privacy and 
protect the self, and it also allows us to suggest how the law can do 
so.
Section I characterizes the ubiquitous “I’ll see” of contemporary 
surveillance. A key point is that the data collected typically fails to 
adequately represent the values, purposes, and intentions of the 
PRIVACY 112 (2008) (“Theorists have proclaimed the value of privacy to be protecting intimacy, 
friendship, individuality, human relationships, autonomy, freedom, self-development, creativity, 
independence, imagination, counterculture, eccentricity, thought, democracy, reputation, and 
psychological well-being.”). 
 8. Helen Nissenbaum’s work sparked the current focus on privacy in public. See Helen 
Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. LAW REV. 119 (2004); Helen 
Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: The Challenges of Information 
Technology, 7 ETHICS BEHAV. 207 (1997); Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an 
Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW PHILOS. 559–596 (1998). Our 
approach in terms of norms is indebted to her work. There is a well-established practice in 
sociology of regarding privacy as existing in public through selective disclosure. See Stephanie 
M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL
LAW REV. 905 (2010). 
 9. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies, 11 AM. J. SOCIOL.
441, 468 (1906). 
 10. CHRISTENA E. NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 22 (2010) (quoting IRWIN
ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE,
TERRITORY, CROWDING 10 (1975). 
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subjects of that data. We return to this point in Section V when we 
argue that ubiquitous surveillance undermines trust and poses a threat 
to the self. The essential background to this claim consists in 
connections among the concepts of the self, social roles, and privacy 
in public. We explain those connections in Section II. We argue that 
people seek to realize a multifaceted self by interacting social roles, 
and that realizing a social role typically requires a significant degree 
of control over how one appears to others. Privacy in public consists 
in significant part in having such control. Section III argues for the 
following claims. (i) People achieve control over their appearance 
through conformity to informational norms, which are social norms 
that govern the collection, use, and distribution of information. (ii) 
Coordination under informational norms requires not just knowledge, 
but what game theorists, philosophers, and computer scientists call 
common knowledge. (iii) Common knowledge underlies an important 
form of trust. In Section IV, we explain how social roles create 
common knowledge and hence the relevant kind of trust, and in 
Section V we explain how the investigative gaze undermines role-
based common knowledge and thereby erodes trust. The consequence 
is an imminent threat of a precipitous decline in opportunities for self-
realization. The solution is to appropriately restrict surveillance while 
preserving and restoring role-based common knowledge and the trust 
it creates. Privacy advocates and policy makers have focused on the 
first task but ignored the second. We conclude Section V by arguing 
that the second task urgent. The reason is the threat to the self that 
pervasive surveillance creates. Section V explains and evaluates that 
threat.
I. THE INVESTIGATIVE GAZE
Othello’s “I see” illustrates what we will call the investigative 
gaze. To investigate is to search out and examine details in order to 
learn hidden facts. To gaze is to look steadily and intently. Othello 
looks at Desdemona steadily and intently in hopes of revealing facts 
that will show whether she is faithful. Businesses and governments 
gaze steadily and intently virtually everyone searching for facts that 
will show them what they want to know. 
The investigative gaze includes an observational gaze, and a 
predictive gaze. 
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A.  The Observational Gaze 
The “I’ll see” of contemporary surveillance gives businesses and 
governments a massive capacity to observe a person’s past. It is that 
capacity we will refer to as the observational gaze. It is only a small 
exaggeration to say that the observational gaze records every 
keystroke, each mouse click, every touch of the screen, card swipe, 
Google search, Amazon purchase, Instagram, “like,” tweet, scan—
in short, everything we do in our new digital age can be recorded, 
stored, and monitored. Every routine act on our iPads and tablets, 
on our laptops, notebooks, and Kindles, office PCs and 
smartphones, every transaction with our debit card, gym pass, E-
ZPass, bus pass, and loyalty cards can be archived, data-mined, 
and traced back to us.11
Data collection is so pervasive that “if you figure that your life is 
so disorganized, private, and fragmented that no biographer would or 
could keep track of it, think again—your biography is being written as 
you read these pages.”12 The information flows into vast databases. 
Retailers, banks, governments, social networking sites, credit 
reference agencies and telecoms companies, amongst others, hold 
vast amounts of information about us. They know where we live, 
what we spend our money on, who our friends and family are, our 
likes and dislikes, our lifestyles and our opinions. Every year the 
amount of electronic information about us grows as we 
increasingly use internet services, social media and smart devices 
to move more and more of our lives into the online environment.13
Not all the stored information is true. Indeed, “databases are 
riddled with errors and meaningless coincidences.”14 However, while 
not always true, the observational gaze often is. 
 11. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
1 (2015). 
 12. JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 43 (2012). 
 13. STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: MYTHS,
MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 1 (2014). 
14. See, e.g., Simson L. Garfinkel, Data Fusion: Information of the World, Unite!, 299 
SCI. AM. 82 (2008). A recent study of ratings of creditworthiness from the National Consumer 
Law Center found that the reports it requested “were riddled with inaccuracies. Errors ranged 
from the mundane—a wrong e-mail address or incorrect phone number—to seriously flawed. 
One of the reports combined information about our volunteer with information about two other 
individuals; other reports listed wrong addresses, relatives, and occupations. Interestingly, 
eBureau touts its ability to estimate income based on its advanced models and offer insights 
based upon the consumer’s education. Despite that claim, seven of the fifteen consumer reports 
generated by eBureau contained errors in estimated income, nearly doubling the salary of one 
2016] “I’LL SEE”: HOW SURVEILLANCE UNDERMINES PRIVACY 227
Palantir is a good illustration. Palantir sells “platforms for 
integrating, managing, and securing data.”15 It can tie “together 
surveillance video. . . with credit-card transactions, cell-phone call 
records, e-mails, airplane travel records, and Web search 
information.”16 To illustrate how their products work, they present a 
fictional scenario in which Mike Fikri (a fictional character) gets a 
speeding ticket on his way to Orlando, Florida.17 The ticket sets off an 
alert in the CIA’s Palantir system, prompting an analyst to search for 
data. A graphical user interface displays the results: finger print and 
DNA evidence collected in Cairo; an ATM video from Miami; photos 
of his rental truck license plate at a tollbooth; phone records showing 
calls to Syria; and, a map of his national and international 
movements. Mouse clicks reveal more: Fikri has been wiring money 
to the people he has been calling in Syria; the Syrians, under 
investigation already, have been meeting every day for two weeks and 
have purchased plane tickets with Fikri’s money. A map traces the 
money flow from Cairo to Fikri in Miami, and from Fikri to the 
Syrians. In light of the information, the Miami police arrest Fikri. 
Fikri is fictional, but the capacity to know it illustrates is real. The 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), for example, reports that 
“Detectives love the type of information it [Palantir] provides. They 
can now do things that we could not do before. They can now exactly 
see great information and the links between events and people. It’s 
brought great success to LAPD.”18
The massive capacity to know evokes the often used metaphor of 
the Panopticon.19 The Panopticon is a prison consisting of two 
participant and halving the salary of another, and eleven of the fifteen reports incorrectly stated 
the volunteer’s education level.” PERSIS YU, ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, BIG
DATA, A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER CREDITWORTHINESS 18 (2014), http://
www.nclc.org/issues/big-data.html. 
 15. About | Palantir, PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.palantir.com/about/ (last 
visited Jun 14, 2014). 
 16. Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, Palantir, the War on Terror’s Secret Weapon,
BUSINESSWEEK (NOV. 22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/5771-palantir-
the-war-on-terrors-secret-weapon.
 17. Fikri is a fictional character Palantir uses when it shows prospective customers how 
its products work. See id.
 18. Matt Burns, Leaked Palantir Doc Reveals Uses, Specific Functions And Key Clients,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 30, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/11/leaked-palantir-doc-reveals-
uses-specific-functions-and-key-clients/.
 19. The source of the metaphor is JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE 
INSPECTION-HOUSE (2008). As Julie Cohen notes, “[i]mportant work in information privacy 
often invokes the Panopticon and other visual metaphors to drive home important points about 
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concentric circular structures. The outermost structure contains the 
prisoners’ cells. The guards occupy the inner most structure, from 
which they can see into any cell through windows that prevent the 
prisoners from seeing the guards. The result is that the prisoners never 
know when the guards are watching. The effect is that the prisoners 
behave as if they were under constant surveillance. There is little or 
no “as if” with today’s observational gaze. It actually watches 
virtually everyone virtually all the time, and it sees more than just the 
observable behavior of prisoners confined to cells. It sweeps over 
vastly more data generated in a wide and diverse range of contexts 
and provides far more insight into people’s inner lives than the 
Panopticon guards could gain from their occasional observations. 
The insight the observational gaze offers is, however, still highly 
limited and selective. The reason is that data is acontextual.
“Acontextual” means not determined by context, but we will use it in 
the following special sense. Data is acontextual when it does not 
contain an adequate representation of the context in which it occurred. 
An adequate representation is one that reveals a relevant range of the 
values, purposes, and intentions of the subject (or subjects) of that 
data. 
B.  Acontextual Data 
The following example sets the stage for our discussion of 
acontextual data. 
A person was doing data entry for a contractor who was 
developing a tracking system for young people who were under 
state supervision. The frustration that finally drove her to quit the 
job was that the architecture of the database didn’t allow social 
service workers to include narrative information about the context 
of kids’ behavior. Simply, the system tracked each student’s 
“success” or “failure” in a number of different programs. So, for 
example, if students stopped going to an afterschool program 
because they faced a serious crisis—a death in the family or an 
apartment fire, for example—a caseworker worker was forced to 
check a box that reported that they failed to complete the program. 
Because there was no input box for narrative case notes, there was 
information-based risk.” JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 124 (2012). 
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literally no place in the system to account for the (sometimes pages 
of) contextual information written in the social workers’ reports.20
The complaint is that the categories omit contextual information 
necessary to understand the values, purposes, and intentions that 
explain why the student succeeded or failed. One could, of course, add 
a checkbox for “death in the family” or “apartment fire,” but that 
would still fail to capture the values, purposes, and intentions behind 
the student’s reaction to those events. One understands values, 
purposes, and intentions through narratives that integrate them and the 
context in which they occur into a meaningful pattern. No set of 
checkboxes, however elaborate, will constitute such a narrative. 
The point holds for databases generally. Traditional relational 
databases21 store data in tables consisting of rows and columns.22
Think of each column as labeled on top with some attribute like 
“height” or “is an iPhone owner.” Think of each row as labeled with 
the name of a person or thing (“John Smith” or “Mazda Miata with 
license plate so-and-so”) or type of person (“Chicago residents” or 
“Mazda Miatas”). As you go across any row, the entries under the 
columns indicate the values of attributes, so for example John Smith 
might be six feet tall and not an iPhone owner.23 Organizations 
carefully prepare data before they enter it into their databases.24 The 
reason is that 
Data is dirty, filthy, messy stuff. Often it’s incorrect, missing or 
badly formatted, particularly where humans have been involved in 
creating and/ or collecting it. Sometimes numeric data is held as text, 
or text data is forced into fixed-length fields resulting in some data 
being truncated, and so on. Consequently, a lot of the time and 
 20. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, DIGITAL DEAD END: FIGHTING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 95 (2011). 
21. See generally ABRAHAM SILBERSHATZ, HENRY F. KORTH & S. SUDARSHAN,
DATABASE SYSTEM CONCEPTS (6th ed. 2010). 
 22. A traditional relational database has much the same properties as an Excel 
spreadsheet, except that its underlying implementation allows it to usefully hold much larger 
tables, e.g., tables with millions of rows. 
 23. For an attribute such as “is an iPhone owner” a computer scientist would think of the 
database entries as indicating one of the two values “true” or “false”, but we can equally think of 
them as indicating that the attribute is present or absent. 
 24. FINLAY, supra note 13 at 95 (“Maintaining data quality has always been an issue with 
consumer databases. As a consequence, most organizations have checks and controls in place at 
the points where data enters their systems. Data is only allowed onto their databases once it has 
been formatted, cleaned, and validated.”). 
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effort. . . can be spent “cleaning” the data before it’s ready to be 
used.25
The result is that databases store the formatted and cleaned trails 
of data detritus people leave behind as they live. They do not store 
narratives tying events into a meaningful whole that reveals values, 
purposes, and intentions. The data is, in this sense, highly acontextual. 
This is no accident. “Institutions—from universities to software 
companies to public welfare agencies—[are] organized for efficient 
achievement of their appointed ends.”26 They collect data for their 
purposes, not to paint faithful narrative portraits of data subjects. 
But aren’t we overlooking the “big data” revolution? “Big data” 
consists in large part of unstructured data.27 Examples include 
multimedia files, “e-mails, blogs, web pages and transcripts of phone 
conversations.”28 Such data may reveal a person’s values, purposes, 
and intentions—to some extent, but it would be a mistake to think it 
can be worked into “a composite sketch [of the intentions behind] of 
what we like, whom we love, what we read, how we vote, and where 
we protest.”29 The “composite sketch” may reveal that Victoria 
recently read Sense and Sensibility, has been married to Victor for 
thirty years, voted for Obama in 2012, and protested in Chicago 
against immigration policy. 
But it will be much more difficult for it to reveal whether she 
likes Sense and Sensibility (or read it reluctantly for a reading group), 
Victoria loves Victor (or is staying married for the sake of the 
children), was an enthusiastic Obama supported (or a disappointed 
Clinton supporter reluctantly voting for Obama), objects to 
immigration policy (or is ambivalent and joined the protest to support 
a friend). 
A “composite sketch” will rarely do what a narrative does: 
integrate context, action, conversation, and soliloquy in a meaningful 
whole that reveals the values, purposes, and intentions that come to 
25. Id.
 26. RULE, supra note 4 at 156. 
 27. FINLAY, supra note 13, at 180 (“These days, things are very different. Organizations 
are awash with textual and other types of unstructured data. All sorts of customer 
correspondence, which until the late 1990s would have been held in racks of filing cabinets, is 
now stored in electronic format; and then there is all that Internet data, such as tweets, blogs and 
web pages.”). 
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 11. 
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fruition in one’s observable activity.30 The “composite sketch” will be 
an aggregation of diverse sorts of data created in different contexts 
with a variety of values, purposes, and intentions, but the “sketch” 
will omit what did not get recorded, and those omissions will include 
a good part of the relevant context, values, purposes, and intentions.31
Acontextual data is not useless—far from it. Palantir illustrates 
the power of the observational gaze to penetrate into peoples’ pasts. 
Contemporary surveillance does not merely survey the past. It also 
aspires to predict the future. 
C.  The Predictive Gaze 
“The most prolific use of data mining is to identify relationships 
in data that give an insight into individual preferences, and most 
importantly, what someone is likely to do in a given scenario.”32  The 
government does not, for example, merely observe Fikri’s past, it 
predicts (as the story implies) that he is a terrorist and arrests him. 
Businesses and governments use computer-based statistical 
analysis to make predictions, an approach known as predictive 
analytics. In many situations, “models created using predictive 
analytics make better predictions than their human counterparts.”33
This is not particularly high praise. Humans are bad at prediction in 
the sorts of situations in which the models do better—just somewhat
better. The predictions are quite often false. Indeed, “most predictive 
models are quite poor at predicting how someone is going to 
behave.”34 The results can bemuse: 
I’m able to understand why [the data aggregator] Acxiom thinks I 
have one child when I have none—I buy gifts for young nieces and 
nephews. . . Household income is off, and shopping data says that I 
made one purchase in the last 24 months for online and offline 
purchases at retailers! That’s hysterical! Supposedly I’m interested 
 30. Deborah G. Johnson, et al., Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency, 19 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959 (2011) (using the metaphor of a house of mirrors to catalogue 
the ways in which the presentation of information online can create misimpressions and 
misinterpretations).
31. See FINLAY, supra note 13 (“Organizations have little control over how [unstructured 
data is] supplied and formatted”). 
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also JOHN W. FOREMAN, DATA SMART: USING DATA SCIENCE TO 
TRANSFORM INFORMATION INTO INSIGHT 285 (2013). (noting that “[t]he only guarantee with 
forecasting is that your forecast is wrong”); Joanna Geary, DoubleClick (Google): What is it and 
what does it do?, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2012/apr/23/doubleclick-tracking-trackers-cookies-web-monitoring (last visited Dec 18, 2015). 
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in cooking, but I hate cooking. Perhaps the one purchase they have 
me buying in the past 24 months was a cookbook for someone.35
The predictive gaze is an often false gaze. That is hardly 
surprising. The input to the predictions consists of stored data that is 
to a great extent acontextual,36 and such data provides a relatively 
poor basis for predicting behavior. The reason is its limited ability to 
capture values, purposes, and intentions. By way of illustration, 
imagine you are trying to predict whether Victoria will remain 
married to Victor once their children graduate from college in two 
scenarios. In the first, all you know is that Victoria has been married 
to Victor for thirty years. In the second, you know that she regards her 
marriage with Victor as loveless, places a large disvalue on remaining 
in loveless relationships, and intends to divorce Victor when their 
children graduate from college. Your knowledge of Victoria’s values, 
purposes, and intentions in the second scenario obviously provides a 
more reliable basis for predicting what she will do. 
Given this limitation, it may seem surprising that in “many 
organizations across many industries, predictive models are 
generating useful predictions and are being used to significantly 
enhance what those organizations are doing.”37 The explanation is 
that predictive analytics works particularly well as long as the 
following three conditions are met. 
 A significant improvement in prediction accuracy, even with low 
final accuracy. Direct mailing campaigns are a good illustration. If a 
company mails an offer to a more or less randomly selected list of 
people with whom it has no prior relationship, about 1% of those 
contacted respond.38 Using predictive analytics to select the group to 
receive the mailing will improve the response rate to 10% to 20%.39
Significantly increased benefit from improved prediction 
accuracy. In the mailing example, the improved response rate can 
significantly increase sales. The data scientists Foster Provost and 
Tom Fawcett contend that “the more data-driven a firm is, the more 
 35. Adam Tanner, Bizarro World Of Hilarious Mistakes Revealed In Long Secret 
Personal Data Files Just Opened, FORBES, TECH (Sept. 5, 2013), http://goo.gl/S8BubO. 
 36. FINLAY, supra note 13 (noting that “All of the methods used to create predictive 
models require data to be well structured, and the data must be categorical (e.g. occupation, 
marital status and gender) or numeric (e.g. age, income and time at address). A predictive model 
can’t be built if the data is not in one of these two formats.”). 
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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productive it is. . . [data driven decision-making] is associated with a 
4%– 6% increase in productivity. . . [and] also is correlated with 
higher return on assets, return on equity, asset utilization, and market 
value.”40 To yield a net benefit, the increased benefit must be greater 
than the costs it imposes. That is in part a question of the cost of false 
positives and negatives.
False positives and false negatives either decrease from 
whatever approach would otherwise be taken or are low in an 
absolute sense. A false positive is the mistaken indication that the 
predicted condition is present. A false negative is the mistaken 
indication that it is absent. In the mailing example, there will be a lot 
of both. A 10% to 20% response rate is a failure rate of 80% to 90%. 
So there will be a lot of people mailed who do not respond (the false 
positives). Inevitably there will also be many people not mailed who 
would have responded (the false negatives). The costs are relatively 
low, however. They divide into the costs to the business, costs to 
consumers, and costs to society as a whole. 
Assume consumers who respond (“true positives”) are better off. 
Then, compared to a random list, both business and consumers are 
better off, since both false positives and false negatives decrease. 
Compared to not sending direct mail at all, false negatives decrease, 
but false positives increase. For the business, the cost of false 
positives is relatively small—the cost of preparing and sending the 
direct mail. For false positive consumers the cost is simply receiving 
advertisements to which they do not respond. The costs to society are 
also low—at least arguably. Indeed, advertising plays a key role in 
market economies, which require a flow of information between 
businesses and consumers. 
Advertising, and consumer responses to it, is a key component of 
that flow. It would be interesting to pursue the issues advertising 
raises, but that lies outside the scope of our concern here. Instead, we 
continue our examination of the investigative gaze by turning to its 
use to allocate costs and benefits. 
D.  Allocating Costs and Benefits 
To allocate costs and benefits, businesses and governments use 
the investigative gaze to construct digital profiles. The profiles are far 
 40. FOSTER PROVOST & TOM FAWCETT, DATA SCIENCE FOR BUSINESS: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DATA MINING AND DATA-ANALYTIC THINKING 6 (2013). 
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from accurate portraits, as we noted above. Nonetheless, a person’s 
profile is 
constantly touched. It’s examined and judged. When we apply for 
a bank loan, it’s our data that determines whether or not we get it. 
When we try to board an airplane, it’s our data that determines 
how thoroughly we get searched—or whether we get to board at 
all. If the government wants to investigate us, they’re more likely 
to go through our data than they are to search our homes; for a lot 
of that data, they don’t even need a warrant. Who controls our data 
controls our lives. It’s true. Whoever controls our data can decide 
whether we can get a bank loan, on an airplane or into a country. 
Or what sort of discount we get from a merchant, or even how 
we’re treated by customer support.41
This pervasive use of profiles means businesses and government 
use them to allocate costs and benefits in situations in which false 
positives and negatives impose considerable costs on individuals and 
society. These costs can be quite high when denying or permitting 
bank loans, air travel, border crossings, government searches, and 
preferential treatment. Other examples include employment,42 health 
insurance,43 the extension of credit,44 direct marketing,45 price 
discrimination,46 and news reporting.47 In many of those cases it is, to 
say the least, less than clear that the benefits outweigh the costs.48
 41. Bruce Schneier, Essays: Our Data, Ourselves, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, (May 15, 
2008), https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2008/05/our_data_ourselves.html. 
42. See Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, PRIVACY
RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE (April 12, 2002), https://www.privacyrights.org/ar/
onlinepubrecs.htm; Joseph Walker, Do New Job Tests Foster Bias?, THE WALL ST. J.,
(September 20, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10000872396390443890304578006283936708970.html. 
43. See ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: THE CRISIS
IN ONLINE PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY 107-09 (2013). 
44. See RULE, supra note 5, at 197-99 (discussing the greatly enhanced ability of 
creditors to determine whether their criteria of credit worthiness are fulfilled).; Andy Oram, 
Credit card company data mining makes us all instances of a type, O’REILLY RADAR (May 14, 
2009), http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/05/credit-card-company-data-minin.html; Charles Duhigg, 
What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, (May 12, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html.
 45. SLOAN & WARNER, supra note 43, at 96 (discussing norms involved in direct 
marketing).
 46. Price discrimination and its data collection practices are controversial. Andrew 
Odlyzko, Privacy and the clandestine evolution of e-commerce, in ICEC ‘07: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3–6 (2007). 
 47. Technology has both expanded reporters access to information and their ability to 
report it through non-traditional means such as blogs. The greatly increased depth to which 
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It is hardly surprising then that allocative uses of acontextual 
data have provoked extensive criticism. We briefly review the 
criticisms, and we contrast them with a second critique. That critique 
is concerned with the massive capacity to know as realized in the 
investigative gaze, and it focuses on the effects surveillance has 
independently of its allocative use. We refine and extend this second 
line of criticism. Before doing so, however, we briefly summarize 
both critiques in order to set our proposals against the proper 
background. 
E.  Two Critiques 
We begin with the critique of using the investigative gaze for 
allocation.
1.  The critique of allocation 
The critique of using the investigative gaze for allocation takes 
different forms in the case of the government and private business. 
The governmental critique focuses on the use of surveillance to 
discourage and prevent behavior of which the government 
disapproves.49 Critics claim that the government illegitimately uses
surveillance to discourage or prevent activities typically considered 
permissible in a democratic state.50 The wide and penetrating reach of 
governmental surveillance affects a disturbingly long list of types of 
people.51 Still, most people are not on that list. So, how does 
surveillance harm them? Critics answer by identifying a long-term, 
systemic harm. They contend that some or all of the uses are 
illegitimate exercises of governmental power that harm society as a 
whole by limiting free expression and political debate and creating a 
culture of oppression.52
The critique of private business surveillance is diffuse and 
complex. Our goal, however, is to contrast that critique with the 
critique of the capacity to know, and for that purpose, it is sufficient 
reporters can penetrate into people’s lives is highly controversial. JON L MILLS, PRIVACY: THE
LOST RIGHT 287 (2008). 
48. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
49. See Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, The Self, the Stasi, and the NSA: Privacy, 
Knowledge, and Complicity in the Surveillance State, 17 MINN. J. LAW SCI. & TECHN. 347, 380-
84 (2016). 
50. See id. at 380-81. 
51. See id. at 380. 
52. See id. at 372-74 n. 102-16 and accompanying text. 
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to list six main criticisms. They are that information processing 
practices: (1) discriminate among individuals in unfair ways,53 (2) 
result in a distribution of costs and benefits across society that is 
unjust,54 (3) create a chilling effect that leads to excessive 
conformity,55 (4) lack transparency and accountability,56 (5) fail to 
ensure free and informed consent to the collection and use of data,57
53. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 72; SLOAN & WARNER, supra note 43, at 273-
302.
54. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 45;
RULE, supra note 4, at 12. 
55. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA FROM
SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR 92 (2004) (noting that “[u]biquitous but fragmented, 
commercial surveillance helps make us obedient; it create consumers with predictable tastes, 
borrowers who repay their debts, and personality structures acclimated to cooperation with 
authority”); HEIDI BOGHOSIAN & LEWIS LAPHAM, SPYING ON DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE, CORPORATE POWER AND PUBLIC RESISTANCE 27 (2013) (“Distracted by the 
rush and convenience of information technology, few of us discern that opening a window into 
our personal transactions helps shape a culture of conformity and normalizes the nefarious 
business of domestic intelligence gathering”); PASQUALE, supra note 48,  at 15 (“In his book 
Turing’s Cathedral, George Dyson quipped that ‘Facebook defines who we are, Amazon defines 
what we want, and Google defines what we think.’ We can extend that epigram to include 
finance, which defines what we have (materially, at least), and reputation, which increasingly 
defines our opportunities.”). 
56. See e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 61. 
 57. The criticism here is extensive. An early and influential critique is Paul Schwartz, 
Internet Privacy and the State, 22 CONN. LAW REV. 815 (2000) (Notice and Choice does not 
ensure free choice because of information asymmetries, collective action problems, limited 
rationality, and a lack of market options). More recent critiques include:  MARGARET JANE
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) 
(Notice and choice as implemented is inconsistent with the requirements of free choice); 
COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY AND U.S. PIRG, IN THE MATTER OF A 
PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT ON PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 33 (2011), http://
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyreportframework/00338-57839.pdf (“Informed consent in the 
digital marketing era requires . . . a new commitment to candor and honesty .#.#. [the online 
marketing industry] needs to clearly explain to the user how the data are collected and used”); 
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DEDALUS 32, 36 (2011) 
(noting “the transparency paradox. Achieving transparency means conveying information 
handling practices [however] If notice . . . finely details every [relevant fact] .#.#. we know that 
it is unlikely to be understood, let alone read. But summarizing practices in the style of, say, 
nutrition labels is no more helpful because it drains away important details, ones that are likely 
to make a difference,” and arguing for a much greater reliance on context); Solon Barocas & 
Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND 
MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFORMATION (2009), http://senseable.mit.edu/
engagingdata/downloads.html (consumers “confront . . . full-on barriers to achieving meaningful 
understanding of the practice and uses to which they are expected to be able to consent.”); Paul 
M. Schwartz & Daniel Solove, Notice and Choice:  Implications for Digital Marketing to Youth,
(2009), http://digitalads.org/documents/Schwartz_Solove_Notice_Choice_NPLAN_BMSG_
memo.pdf (Notice and Choice fails to ensure a free choice and fails to ensure an informed 
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and (6) contribute to governmental surveillance in ways that are 
inadequately regulated.58
2.  The critique of the capacity to know 
The critique of the capacity to know addresses the negative 
effects surveillance has independently of the allocation of costs and 
benefits. 59 As Bruce Schneier notes, 
Psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, novelists, and 
technologists have all written about the effects of constant 
surveillance, or even just the perception of constant surveillance. 
Studies show that. . . [s]urveillance strips us of our dignity. It 
threatens our very selves as individuals. It’s a dehumanizing tactic 
employed in prisons and detention camps around the world.60
The open question is why—and under what conditions—
surveillance “threatens our very selves as individuals.” It does not 
appear to do so in all cases. Consider public health, for example. 
Public health officials record details of disease and treatment, often in 
ways that allow personal identification. That information 
has provided the foundation for planning, intervention, and disease 
prevention and has been critical for epidemiological research into 
patterns of morbidity and mortality for a wide variety of diseases 
and conditions. Registries have been essential for tracking 
individuals and their conditions over time. Surveillance has also 
choice); Fred Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in THE FAILURE OF 
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES 342, 369 (Jane Winn ed., 2006) (“as transposed into 
contemporary privacy laws and regulations, FIPPS [Fair Information Privacy Practices] have 
been used to glorify individual choice as if that, and not appropriate privacy protection, were the 
goal of data protection. While privacy advocates and policymakers cling tenaciously to FIPPS, 
at least in their rhetoric, the reality is that FIPPS as applied today largely disserve both privacy 
and other important societal interests.”); J. Howard, III Beales & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or 
Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information,  UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 109–
135, 114 (2008) (“The reality that decisions about information sharing are not worth thinking 
about for the vast majority of consumers contradicts the fundamental premise of the notice 
approach to privacy.”); RULE, supra note 4 (privacy advocates pay insufficient attention to how 
to balance privacy versus competing concerns). 
58. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership, SCHNEIER ON 
SECURITY (July 31, 2013), https://www.schneier.com/essay-436.html. 
59. See e.g., Bruce Schneier, The Internet is a surveillance state, CNN (March 16, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-surveillance/index.html; Sandra 
Fulton, Senate Report Opens a Window Into Hidden World of Data Aggregators, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/
senate-report-opens-window-hidden-world-data-aggregators; PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 61. 
 60. BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 127 (2015). 
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served to trigger the imposition of public health control measures, 
such as contact tracing, mandatory treatment, and quarantine.61
Controversies abound over the appropriate type and acceptable 
extent of public health surveillance,62 but few would deny that some
surveillance is justified, and it seems difficult to see how 
appropriately circumscribed public health surveillance poses a threat 
to the self.63
We take the critics’ concern, however, to be, not with particular 
cases, but with the consequences of a ubiquity to the investigative 
gaze and in particular its use to create “profiles of individuals and 
groups based on their activities, connections, performances, 
transactions and movements that relate to, among other things, 
government departments.”64 The concern is that “[o]ur identity is 
understood by others—and by inanimate machines—more from our 
data-image than from our personal communication.”65 The problem is 
that
[p]articular forms of communication are a vital aspect of what it 
means to be human. What we disclose to whom, and under what 
conditions, is highly significant. What once we might have 
revealed, consciously, about ourselves to someone we trust—
friend, doctor, priest, therapist—may now be involuntarily 
disclosed by electronic means to organizations or machines that we 
cannot know, let alone trust, in the same way.66
The question, however, remains: why is pervasive use of digital 
profiles a threat to identity? There is no question that the ubiquity of 
the investigative gaze signals a profound change in the way people 
relate to businesses, governments, and each other, but why isn’t that 
just a change? Why is it a “threat to our very selves”?67
 61. AMY L. FAIRCHILD ET AL., SEARCHING EYES: PRIVACY, THE STATE, AND DISEASE
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 204 (2007). For concern about the sharing of health information, 
see, e.g., Lori Andrews et al., Privacy Policies of Android Diabetes Apps and Sharing of Health 
Information, 315 JAMA: THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1051 
(2016), and Lori Andrews, Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues in Genetic Testing for Complex 
Genetic Diseases, VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 793 (2003). 
62. See generally FAIRCHILD ET AL., supra note 61. 
63. Id.
 64. DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE AFTER SNOWDEN 81 (2015). 
 65. LYON, supra note 54, at 19. 
66. Id.
 67. BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 127 (2015). 
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Commentators offer a variety of metaphors that suggest 
directions in which to pursue possible explanations. People become 
“mere algorithm fodder,”68 “nodes of information production,”69 and 
puppets manipulated through “invisible threads.”70 Jean Baudrillard 
offers one of the more elaborate and suggestive characterizations: 
We are constantly confronted with the anticipated statistical 
verification of our behavior, and absorbed by this permanent 
refraction of our least movements, we are no longer confronted 
with our own will. We are no longer even alienated. . . each 
individual is forced despite himself or herself into the undivided 
coherency of statistics. There is in this a positive absorption into 
the transparency of computers, which is something worse than 
alienation.71
We will return to these metpahors in Section V, but our initial 
guiding metaphor is different. It is Othello.
Othello’s “I’ll see” leads him, under Iago’s spell, to construct a 
“data profile” of Desdemona that paints her as unfaithful, a “whore” 
in Othello’s eyes.72 Othello constructs the profile out of acontextual 
 68. PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 198. 
 69. RONALD J. DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: INSIDE THE BATTLE FOR CYBERSPACE 63 (2011) 
(noting that “we no longer move about our lives as self-contained beings, but as nodes of 
information production in a dense network of digital relations involving other nodes of 
information production”). 
 70. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 208 (2003). The full quote is: 
“As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, each containing a 
number of questions . . . . There are thus hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, 
millions of threads in all . . . they are not visible . . . but every man is constantly aware of their 
existence . . . . Each man, permanently aware of his own invisible threads, naturally develops a 
respect for the people who manipulate the threads.” Bruce Schneier has applied the passage to 
contemporary surveillance. Bruce Schneier, The Value of Privacy, WASH. NOTE, (June 9, 2006), 
http://washingtonnote.com/bruce_schneier_1/.
 71. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRITINGS 213 (2001). 
72. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, [a]ct 4, sc. 2 
(DESDEMONA
Alas, what ignorant sin have I committed? 
OTHELLO
Was this fair paper, this most goodly book, 
Made to write “whore” upon? What committed! 
Committed!—O thou public commoner! 
I should make very forges of my cheeks, 
That would to cinders burn up modesty, 
Did I but speak thy deeds.—What committed! 
Heaven stops the nose at it, and the moon winks; 
The bawdy wind, that kisses all it meets, 
Is hush’d within the hollow mine of earth, 
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data—data torn out of the context that reveals values, purposes, and 
intentions. A good example is Othello’s eavesdropping s on a 
conversation between Iago and Cassio about Cassio’s mistress, 
Bianca. Iago sets up both the conversation and the eavesdropping 
because he knows that Othello will interpret the conversation to be 
about Cassio’s non-existent affair with Desdemona, and 
As he [Cassio] shall smile Othello shall go mad; 
And his unbookish jealousy must construe 
Poor Cassio’s smiles, gestures, and light behavior 
Quite in the wrong.73
Othello does “go mad.” He no longer trusts Desdemona and 
summarily dismisses as lies her professions of love. Fixated on her 
data profile, he no longer perceives the real Desdemona, whom he 
finally kills—thinking he is killing the data-profile-Desdemona. 
Othello suggests that fixation on acontextual data profiles can destroy 
trust and threaten the self by rendering it no longer visible. We 
develop this suggestion in Section V. The essential background  
consists in important connections among the concepts of the self, 
social roles, and privacy in public. 
II. SELF, SOCIAL ROLES, AND PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
We begin with a summary of the connections we will describe. 
There are four key points. (1) People typically strive to realize a 
multifaceted self. (2) One realizes such a self in large part through a 
variety of social roles. (3) In a wide range of cases, realizing a social 
role requires a significant degree of control over how one appears to 
others. (4) Adequate control over how one appears is essential to an 
adequate degree of privacy in public. 
A.  The Multifaceted Self 
William James characterizes the relevant notion of the self.74 “I 
am,” James writes, 
And will not hear it.—What committed!— 
Impudent strumpet!). 
 73. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1. 
 74. There is more than one candidate for the label “concept of the self.” In particular, 
there are “pure ego” or “center” theories. See C. D BROAD, THE MIND AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE
558f. (2009); COLIN MCGINN, THE CHARACTER OF MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 111f. (2nd ed. 1997). For a commitment based theory of the self, see
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often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my. . . 
selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, 
be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and 
make a million a year, be a wit, a bon vivant, and a lady killer, as 
well as a philosopher, and a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and 
African explorer, as well as a ‘tone poet’ and saint. But the thing is 
simply impossible. . . Such characters may at the outset of life be 
alike possible to a man. But to make anyone of them actual, the 
rest must be more or less suppressed.  So the seeker of his truest, 
strongest, deepest self must review the list carefully, and pick out 
the one on which to stake his salvation.75
James’ point is that you make yourself who you are by what you 
“stand by,” that is, by the commitments you freely strive to realize. 
We take that to be a widely shared conception of the self. One 
correction is called for, however. James suggests that a single 
commitment defines who you are.76 On the contrary, the self you seek 
to realize is a multifaceted self. As John Gray notes, “the power to 
conceive of ourselves in different ways, to harbour dissonant projects 
and perspectives, to inform our thoughts and lives with divergent 
categories and concepts, is integral to our identity as reflective 
beings.”77 This conception of the self underlies liberal political 
philosophy from John Stuart Mill78 to John Rawls79 and Joseph Raz.80
We place ourselves in this tradition, and assume that the realization of 
a multifaceted self is an ideal people strive to realize. 
You realize a multifaceted self in large part through social 
roles.81 To see why, imagine trying to be a bird-watcher in a society 
RICHARD WARNER, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND HAPPINESS: AN ESSAY ON MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1987). 
 75. WILLIAM JAMES, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 309 (1890). 
 76. It is not at all clear that James actually thought you had to single out one self. As he 
notes elsewhere, “Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals 
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind . . . .  Nothing is commoner than to 
hear people discriminate between their different selves of this sort: ‘As a man I pity you, but as 
an official I must show you no mercy; as a politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I 
loathe him;’ etc., etc.” Id. at 295. 
 77. JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 262 – 263 (1993). 
78. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb 
eds., Yale University Press 2003) (1859). 
79. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993). 
80. See generally Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986). 
81. Id. at 311 (emphasizing the importance of social roles—what he calls “social 
forms”—to the development of the self). 
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that does not recognize that role. You track birds to look at them,82
but that does not make you a bird watcher in the sense that a member 
of the Audubon Society is. To be a bird watcher in that sense is to 
fulfill a role society recognizes, and you can refer to that role to 
explain your actions to yourself and others. In the imagined society, 
no such explanation is available. You are just a bird-watching 
anomaly. Similar remarks hold for an immense variety of examples. 
You cannot be a lawyer, medical doctor, or racecar driver unless 
society recognizes the role. Even being a parent, child, lover, or 
spouse take on different meanings depending on the society in which 
the relationships are realized.83
B.  Controlling How One Appears 
In the case of many roles, realizing them requires a significant 
degree of control over how one appears to others. We have discussed 
a number of examples elsewhere.84 Two examples are sufficient for 
our purposes here. Students and teachers provide the first example, 
and journalists the second. 
1.  Students and teachers 
University students and teachers share a goal that they can 
realize only if they can control how they appear to each other. The 
goal is that teachers should assign grades only on the basis of relevant 
academic work.85 Accepting this goal and seeking to realize it is part 
of what constitutes properly realizing the teacher role. To reliably 
achieve the goal, teachers must minimize bias, and that requires that 
students have a relevant degree of control over how they appear to 
their teachers. Students need to appear to teachers primarily in the 
light of their relevant academic achievements, not in light of 
extracurricular aspects of their personalities, past academic records, 
honors, or punishments. To ensure the appropriate appearance, 
82. Id. at 310. 
83. See id.
84. See Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power: Is It All Over?, 17 
TUL. J. TECH. INTELL. PROP. 61 (2014); Sloan & Warner, supra note 49. 
85. See, e.g., Staff and Student Confidentiality, ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS AND 
LECTURERS (2013), https://www.atl.org.uk/help-and-advice/school-and-college/staff-student-
confidentiality.asp; Jonita Davis, Teachers’ Responsibilities for Student Confidentiality; EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/info_8700551_teachers-responsibilities-student-confidentiality.html;
Student Records and Confidentiality, WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
(2013), http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pupil-services/school-social-work/contents/confidentiality/
student-records.
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students need the cooperation of other students and teachers. The 
reason is that how you appear to someone depends on what they know 
about you (you cannot, for example appear truthful to someone who 
knows you are lying). 
Thus, students and teachers must both voluntarily limit 
themselves. Teachers must limit what they tell other teachers and the 
university about the students they know, and students must limit their 
disclosure of what they know about other students. 
2.  Journalists 
Journalists investigating governmental wrongdoing share a goal: 
protecting the political independence of the press by protecting the 
identities of their whistleblowing sources from unwanted 
disclosures.86 To realize this goal, journalists must appear to both the 
government and to their sources as “essential checks on government 
and partners in ensuring a healthy democratic debate,”87 not as 
criminals whom the state should prosecute. The point finds ample 
confirmation in the Obama administration’s unprecedented threats 
and prosecutions of journalists. Human Rights Watch and the 
American Civil Liberties Union report: 
Journalists expressed concern that, rather than being treated as 
essential checks on government and partners in ensuring a healthy 
democratic debate, they may be viewed as suspect for doing their 
jobs. One prominent journalist summed up what many seemed to 
be feeling: “I don’t want the government to force me to act like a 
spy. I’m not a spy; I’m a journalist.”88
The complaint is precisely that journalists appear as criminals 
not as partners. That appearance has a predictable effect on sources: 
they are reluctant to work with investigative journalists. As The New 
York Times journalist Philip Shenon remarked, “My goodness, if I 
were one of my sources, I would never talk to me again, even about 
stories that really would have been a public service.”89 Journalists 
86. See, e.g., Commisioner for Human Rights, ETHICAL JOURNALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2011), https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1863637#P252_37545. 
 87. Human Rights Watch, With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US Surveillance 
is Harming Journalism (July 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/dem14-
withlibertytomonitorall-07282014.pdf.
88. Id.
 89. Molly Redden, Is the “Chilling Effect” Real?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 2013, http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/113219/doj-seizure-ap-records-raises-question-chilling-effect-
real (last visited Feb 1, 2015). 
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need to cooperate with each other to appear appropriately. Faced with 
the massive power of the state, no journalist can unilaterally ensure 
that he or she appears as a partner, not a criminal.90 That takes a 
concerted effort of a critical mass of journalists—enough to serve as 
an effective counterweight to state power. This is not to say that the 
journalists’ concerted efforts are always an effective counterweight. 
The state must also exercise some restraint in the prosecution of 
journalists.91
Similar remarks hold for a wide variety of social roles. People 
interacting in those roles share a goal that can only be realized 
through controlling how they appear, and they cannot achieve that 
control unilaterally but require the cooperation of others. 
Acquaintances, colleagues, friends, and family typically share the 
goal of cordial and harmonious relations. Realizing that goal requires 
controlling appearances through the selective distribution of 
information, and ensuring selectivity requires cooperation. It is easy 
to think of relevant goals for any number of other examples involving 
selective information flows. A washing machine salesperson can ask 
how frequently you plan to do laundry, but not whether you text or 
email more, whereas the opposite is true for an Apple store 
salesperson. The clerk in the wine store cannot ask how many ounces 
of alcohol you consume a day, but your doctor can. Pharmacists can 
ask what other drugs you are taking to guard against drug interactions, 
but not about whether you are happy in your personal relationships; 
your internist and therapist can ask about both. And so on for lawyers, 
real estate agents, repair services, taxi drivers, mechanics, and on and 
on.
People’s interactions through social roles weave a complex 
network over which information flows selectively. We have been 
emphasizing the role of that network in facilitating self-realization. 
Now we turn from the connections to the self to the connections to 
privacy. The role-based interactions through which one selectively 
discloses information create an important kind of privacy. 
90. See e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA,
AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014). We discuss the point at greater length in Sloan and 
Warner, supra note 81. 
 91. Prior to the Obama administration, “the Justice Department’s internal guidelines 
caution prosecutors against compelling the disclosure of the identity of a reporter’s sources.” 
RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS: THE DILEMMA OF STATE SECRECY 106 (2013). 
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C.  The Privacy Spectrum 
Private and public are “sliding scale” opposites.92 Think of a 
spectrum whose endpoints are “completely inaccessible to others” 
(the maximally private end) and “completely accessible to others” 
(the maximally public end). We divide the spectrum into four regions. 
Information that is enclosed occupies a region at the maximally 
private end. To enclose information is to surround it with a barrier 
that prevents others’ access, either entirely or for all but a select group 
of family, friends, or associates.93 Obscure information comprises the 
next region. Information is obscure when it is difficult to find or 
understand.94 Information selectively disclosed in role-based 
interactions follow in that order, and fully public information 
occupies the maximally public end. Obscurity and role-based 
disclosure constitute privacy in public. Both facilitate the limited 
sharing of information. As Bruce Schneier notes, “Privacy isn’t about 
hiding something. It’s about being able to control how we present 
ourselves to the world. It’s about maintaining a public face while at 
the same time being permitted private thoughts and actions.”95
While enclosure and obscurity both merit detailed discussion, we 
focus on role-based disclosure. Role-based interactions facilitate the 
creation of privacy in public through the parties’ coordinating their 
efforts to ensure the selective disclosure of information. People who 
coordinate in this way are often strangers. This point will play an 
important role in what follows, so we conclude this section by 
explaining the point more fully. 
To begin, we note that coordination between strangers is just one 
example of coordination between people when the only relevant 
knowledge that they have of each other is that they present 
themselves as being in certain social roles. You may, for example, 
have known your auto mechanic for years, but know very little about 
him relevant to your coordination as customer and service provider 
except that she presents herself as an auto mechanic (and that her 
efforts seem to keep your car running). The point is the lack of 
knowledge relevant to coordination. When people interacting in 
 92. NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 10, at 4 (“[p]rivacy and publicity . . . are each defined with 
and by each other along [a] conceptual sliding scale.”). 
93. See Sloan and Warner, supra note 49 at 354. 
94. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 
CAL REV 1, 1 (2012). 
 95. Bruce Schneier, Crypto-Gram, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Sept. 15, 2015), https://
www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2015/0915.html.
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social roles coordinate under informational norms, the knowledge 
they have that is relevant to that coordination is that they present 
themselves in certain roles. Such role-based coordination is a constant 
feature of daily life. As Bruce Schneier notes, 
Just today, a stranger came to my door claiming he was here to 
unclog a bathroom drain. I let him into my house without verifying 
his identity, and not only did he repair the drain, he also took off 
his shoes so he wouldn’t track mud on my floors. When he was 
done, I gave him a piece of paper that asked my bank to give him 
some money. He accepted it without a second glance. At no point 
did he attempt to take my possessions, and at no point did I attempt 
the same of him. In fact, neither of us worried that the other 
would. . . Also today, I passed several strangers on the street 
without any of them attacking me. I bought food from a grocery 
store, not at all concerned that it might be unfit for human 
consumption. I locked my front door, but didn’t spare a moment’s 
worry at how easy it would be for someone to smash my window 
in. Even people driving cars, large murderous instruments that 
could crush me like a bug, didn’t scare me.96
Coordination is of course not confined to those whose only 
relevant knowledge is social roles. It occurs across an entire spectrum 
of knowledge. The minimal knowledge end is home to those whose 
relevant knowledge of each other consists primarily in the fact that 
they are interacting in certain roles. We focus on the region around 
the “minimal knowledge” end where, even if the people know each 
other well in some ways, the knowledge they have relevant to 
coordination consists primarily of their role presentations. We will 
refer to people in this region as coordination-strangers, and we will 
shorten that to just “strangers” when the context makes it clear what 
we mean. 
Strangers typically coordinate in selectively disclosing 
information easily, without explicit thought or negotiation. How does 
that happen? Through informational norms. Understanding how 
informational norms do so is the key to understanding how the 
investigative gaze undermines trust. 
III. NORM-ENABLED COORDINATION
Informational norms are social norms that constrain the 
collection, use, and distribution of information. They 
 96. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE TRUST THAT SOCIETY
NEEDS TO THRIVE 1 (2012). 
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circumscribe the type or nature of information about various 
individuals that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or 
even demanded to be revealed. In medical contexts, it is 
appropriate to share details of our physical condition or, more 
specifically, the patient shares information about his or her 
physical condition with the physician but not vice versa; among 
friends we may pour over romantic entanglements (our own and 
those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial 
information; with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at 
work, it is appropriate to discuss work-related goals and the details 
and quality of performance.97
How do informational norms explain the coordination that 
creates privacy in public? We answer in two steps. First, we note that 
the informational norms that facilitate the coordination essential to 
privacy in public are instances of a particular type of norm—
coordination norms.  Second, we note that a special knowledge 
structure explains how coordination norms facilitate coordination. It 
is that structure that the investigative gaze undermines. 
A.  Coordination Norms 
Driving on the right is a classic example of a coordination norm. 
Drivers share a goal. Safety and convenience dictate that they drive 
on the same side as everyone else. No driver can unilaterally realize 
that goal. Drivers must cooperate with other drivers to do so. In “drive 
on the right” countries like the United States, drivers realize the goal 
of driving on the same side by all driving on the right—as long as 
they know others will do so too. If everyone knew that everyone 
would drive on the left, everyone would drive on the left.98 They think 
they ought drive on the left because and only as long as other drivers 
also drive on the left. We define coordination norms by generalizing 
from this example. 
A coordination norm is a behavioral regularity in a group, where 
the regularity exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks 
that, in order to realize a shared goal, he or she ought to conform to 
the regularity as long as everyone else does.99 The “ought” calls for a 
brief comment. Not all thoughts about what one ought to do are 
 97. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. LAW REV. 119, 120 – 
121 (2004). 
98. See H. Peyton Young, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 105, 107-08 (1996) (providing a game-
theoretic explanation of the decision made by individual drivers as to whether to drive on the 
right or left side of the road). 
99. See SLOAN & WARNER, supra note 43, at 56-59. 
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effective in generating action. One may think one ought to learn 
Spanish, but never do it because other demands take precedence. In 
the case of coordination norms, however, the thought “I ought to 
conform” typically leads to conformity. Of course, it yields 
conformity only when people know (or strongly enough believe) that 
others will conform. 
In what follows, we will use “know” as short for “know (or 
strongly enough believe).” The point to emphasize here is that people 
think they ought to conform as long as others do. So, knowledge is 
required. People must know that others will (limited exceptions aside) 
conform; then, they will (limited exceptions aside) conform 
themselves. This appeal to knowledge to explain conformity is correct 
as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. It is not just knowledge that 
explains coordination, but common knowledge, a special knowledge 
structure we characterize in the next section.
Our focus now is on informational norms that are also 
coordination norms. Not all informational norms are coordination 
norms,100 but the ones that concern us are, and from now on we will 
use “informational norms” to mean “informational norms that are also 
coordination norms.” The coordination informational norms facilitate 
creates privacy in public through mutual voluntary restraint. We 
conclude with two examples.101 
1.  Students and teachers 
As we noted earlier, students and teachers share the goal that 
teachers should assign grades primarily on the basis of relevant 
academic work. Realizing that goal requires that students and teachers 
coordinate to ensure the selective disclosure necessary to control over 
how they appear to each other. They coordinate by conforming to the 
following informational norm: within reasonable limits, students 
should disclose and teachers acquire only information relevant to 
evaluating students in the light of their relevant academic 
achievements. Conformity is conditional because there is no point to 
 100. “Make your comments relevant” is an informational norm but not a coordination 
norm. The hallmark of a coordination norm is that you adhere to it only as long as others do, but 
you would probably adhere to the relevant comment norm even if most others did not. 
 101. Both examples involve professional relationships, but, as the early examples suggest, 
the points generalize to a variety of different types of relationships. See supra text 
accompanying n. 94. See also Warner and Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note 82 
(discussing a variety of other examples). 
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in trying to ensure that other teachers have limited information unless 
enough other students and teachers also limit their information. 
2.  Journalists 
Journalists share a goal: protecting the political independence of 
the press by protecting the identities of their whistleblowing sources 
from unwanted disclosures, and realizing that goal requires they 
cooperate to ensure control over how they appear to each other. 
Conformity to the following coordination norm ensures that 
journalists cooperate appropriately: within broad limits, journalists 
protect the political independence of the press by not revealing the 
identities of their whistleblowing sources. If journalists can count on 
conformity to the norm, they can count on appearing as partners in 
preserving democracy, not criminals.102 Conformity is conditional. It 
takes a critical mass of journalists to serve as an effective 
counterweight to the power of the state. Without it, conforming to the 
norm does little to protect the independence of the press. 
B.  What Coordination Requires 
In the last section, we provisionally explained norm-enabled 
coordination by noting that adherents to a coordination norm will 
conform to it if they know others will. That is not, however, a full 
explanation of norm-enabled coordination. An example is helpful, 
and, to that end, we return to the norm of driving on the right. That is 
not an informational norm, but everything we say will be true of such 
norms. It just happens to be simpler and clearer to use driving on the 
right as the sample case. 
Suppose Victoria and Victor are stopped in their respective cars 
at a four-way intersection. Victoria is on one cross street; Victor, on 
the other. Victor signals a left turn, and a moment later he completes 
his turn into the lane opposite Victoria. That is what Victoria was sure 
he would do. But why? She and Victor are strangers. The only 
relevant fact that she knows about him is that he presents himself in 
the role of a driver, so it is possible, for all she knows, that Victor is 
from a left-driving country and will get confused and turn into her.103
Or, enraged at what he sees as the repressive conformity of modern 
life, he could have decided to flout convention by driving on the left. 
102. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 87. 
 103. Countries that drive on the left include India, Australia, New Zealand, Southern 
Africa, the Caribbean, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus, among others. 
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Or it could be that he has never driven before in his life, and has no 
idea that he is supposed to drive on the right. Or. . . with a little 
imagination, one might sketch any number of scenarios in which 
Victor drives on the left. Victoria does not give these possibilities a 
moment’s thought. The same is true of Victor in regard to Victoria. 
Why? 
Our provisional explanation is that she knows Victor will drive 
on the right, and Victor knows she will do so as well. We still owe an 
explanation of how they know that, but grant for the moment that they 
do. The problem is that Victoria can know that Victor will drive on 
the right without Victor realizing that she knows that. Likewise for 
Victoria not realizing that Victor knows that she will drive on the 
right.
Focus for the moment on Victor. Imagine that, if someone were 
to ask him whether Victoria knew that he would drive on the right, he 
would reply, “I am not sure. She may think that I am from a left-
driving country, will get confused and turn into her, or she may 
think. . .” where the dots are filled in with the possibilities in which 
Victor drives on the left. The result is that Victor hesitates to begin his 
left turn. He worries that Victoria may misinterpret his behavior and, 
for example, begin evasive action by turning into the left lane just as 
Victor is also turning into it. 
Similar remarks hold for Victoria. If someone were to ask her 
whether Victor knew that she would drive on the right, she would 
reply, “I am not sure. He may think that I am from a left-driving 
country, will get confused and turn into him, or he may think. . . .” 
Like Victor, Victoria hesitates to begin her turn. 
Coordination fails because of a lack of second-level knowledge. 
It helps at this point to add subscripts to “know” to keep track of 
levels of knowledge. The problem is that Victoria does not know2 that 
Victor knows1 that she will drive on the right, and the same is true of 
Victor. 
So should we add all second-level knowledge requirements to 
our explanation of coordination? For Victoria and Victor, this would 
mean requiring that Victoria knows2 that Victor knows1 that she will 
drive on the right, and that Victor knows2 the same about Victoria. 
But then the same problem arises for at the third-level of knowledge. 
Suppose that Victor knows2 that Victoria knows1 that Victor will 
drive on the right, and suppose Victoria knows2 the same about 
Victor. But suppose also that Victor does not know3 that Victoria 
knows2 that Victor knows1 she will drive on the right. Instead, he 
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thinks, “I know2 that Victoria knows1 that I will drive on the right, but 
she does not realize I know that. She may think I think she is from a 
left-driving country, will get confused, and drive on the left.” Victor 
hesitates to begin his left turn. The same third-level doubt can arise 
for Victoria. 
In general, consider any knowledge-level n at which Victoria 
knowsn that. . . knows1 that Victor will drive on the right, and Victor 
knowsn that. . . knows1 that Victoria will drive on the right. With 
enough ingenuity one can construct examples in which coordination 
fails because one of them fails to known+1. . . that the other knows1
that he or she will drive on the right. 
When driving, no one gives these possibilities any serious 
consideration. No one thinks about them at all (with the exception of 
academics thinking about the theory of coordination when driving). 
Imagine Victor during his driving test explaining to the examiner, “I 
realized I had the right of way to make a left turn, but I did not turn 
because I was worried that the driver on the cross street might not 
continue to drive on the right.” That would be ludicrous. Why? Why 
do drivers who are strangers to each other never think, “There may be 
something about the other driver that will lead him or her not to drive 
on the right?” Why is coordination unhesitating, without explicit 
thought or negation? The question is well known in game theory, as 
the following example from the game theorist Michael Chwe 
illustrates:
Each person might want to take part in an antigovernment protest 
but only if there are enough total protesters to make arrests and 
police repression unlikely. People most often “solve” coordination 
problems by communicating with each other. Simply receiving a 
message, however, is not enough to make an individual participate. 
Because each individual wants to participate only if others do, each 
person must also know that others received a message. For that 
matter, because each person knows that other people need to be 
confident that others will participate, each person must know that 
other people know that other people have received a message, and 
so forth. In other words, knowledge of the message is not enough; 
what is also required is knowledge of others’ knowledge, 
knowledge of others’ knowledge of others’ knowledge, and so 
on.104
 104. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE 3 (2013). 
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Chwe’s solution is the standard one in game theory. The parties 
have what game theorists, philosophers, and computer scientists call 
common knowledge. People have common knowledge that they will 
conform if they know they will conform, know they know it, know 
they know they know it, and so on. 
This is the solution we adopt. Parties to coordination norms 
coordinate without hesitation because they have common knowledge 
that the other parties will conform. Common knowledge makes the 
parties transparent to each other in a way that facilitates coordination 
based on knowledge of what the other parties will do. Everything is 
out in the open. There is no possibility of misunderstanding, 
misinterpretation, doubt, or deception at any knowledge level. We 
claim that the investigative gaze undermines this transparency and 
thereby makes people opaque to each other in ways that make 
coordination problematic. We turn to that claim in Section V. A 
necessary preliminary is to see how relevant common knowledge can 
arise among strangers. The only relevant fact that strangers know 
about each other is that they present themselves to each in certain 
social roles. How can that scant foundation support the rich structure 
of common knowledge? 
IV. COMMON KNOWLEDGE
We answer by first describing a particularly clear case of 
common knowledge—eye contact. We then use that as a model to 
explain how role presentations create common knowledge between 
strangers.
A.  Eye Contact 
Imagine that Alice sees Bob, an old acquaintance. She stares at 
him hoping to remember his name before he sees her. Unfortunately, 
Bob does see her, and Alice realizes that it would be pointless to 
pretend she did not see him. It is pointless because the following 
infinite sequence is true.105
We use the phrase “they see each other” as short for “Alice sees 
Bob, and Bob sees Alice:” 
105. See, e.g., Peter Vanderschraaf & Giacomo Sillari, Common Knowledge, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2014 ed. 2014), http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/common-knowledge/ (last visited July 1, 2015); 
KEN BINMORE & ADAM BRANDEBURGER, COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND GAME THEORY (1988), 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/100630; Paul Milgrom, An axiomatic 
characterization of common knowledge, 49 ECONOMETRICA 219 (1981). 
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First level: 
 Alice knows1 that they see each other. 
Bob knows1 that they see each other. 
Second level: 
Alice knows2 Bob knows1 that they see each other. 
Bob knows2 Alice knows1 that they see each other. 
Third level: 
Alice knows3 Bob knows2 Alice knows1 they see each other. 
Bob knows3 Alice knows2 Bob knows1 they see each other. 
.
.
.
How do Alice and Bob take this infinite series of steps? Start 
with the first level. Alice knows that Bob sees her by reasoning about 
Bob. She reasons this way: “I see Bob with his eyes directly in line 
with mine. Bob has normal perceptual abilities, so I can conclude that 
Bob sees me. Now I see Bob, so I can conclude that we see each 
other.” Bob reasons the same way about Alice, starting from “I see 
Alice with her eyes directly in line with mine.” This gives us the first 
level:
 Alice knows that they see each other. 
 Bob knows that they see each other. 
This explanation may provoke the incredulous response, “No 
one reasons like that!”—and rightly so. It is extremely unlikely that 
Alice (to focus on her) reasons in a way that even approximates the 
reasoning we have attributed to her, and she need not reason at all. 
She may just think, “We see each other!” We do not, however, intend 
the reasoning we attribute to Alice to characterize what she in fact 
does, but what she could do. Alice and Bob have the capacity to 
explicitly reason their way to knowing that they see each other. We 
characterize that capacity by exhibiting explicitly the reasoning that 
Alice and Bob could produce. 
The capacity to reason about each other explains how Alice and 
Bob get to the second-level of knowledge. We describe reasoning as 
if it was explicit, but again the point is the same: to characterize what 
Alice and Bob could do, not what they actually do. Alice reasons: “At 
the first level, I started from the fact I saw Bob’s eyes lined up with 
mine, and I reached the conclusion that Bob sees me. If Bob sees me, 
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he sees my eyes lined up with his. Bob has normal reasoning 
capacities, so, at the first level, Bob will have reasoned just as I did 
from ‘Alice’s eyes are lined up with mine’ to his first-level 
conclusion that we see each other.” 
For Alice to realize that fact about Bob is for her to reach the 
second-level conclusion: “I know2 Bob knows1 we see each other.” 
Bob will reason in the same way to his second-level conclusion that 
he knows2 Alice knows1 they see each other. Thus: 
Alice knows2 Bob knows1 they see each other. 
Bob knows2 Alice knows1 they see each other. 
Alice and Bob get to the rest of the levels the way they get from 
the first level to the second: by reasoning about their reasoning at the 
level below. For any level n, Alice reasons about Bob’s n – 1 level 
reasoning to reach the conclusion that Alice knowsn Bob knowsn - 1. . . 
that they see each other, and Bob reasons in the same way to reach the 
conclusion that that Bob knowsn Alice knowsn - 1. . . that they see each 
other. 
As we emphasized earlier, we are not claiming that Alice and 
Bob actually reason in this way. We are characterizing a capacity to 
generate an infinite sequence of levels of knowledge. The capacity 
makes eye contact transparent. It means that Alice and Bob are 
capable of decisively ruling out any possibility of doubt or deception 
with regard to their seeing each other at any level of knowledge. 
There is nowhere to hide, either inadvertently or by design. People 
achieve a similar transparency when they present themselves in social 
roles.
The point of our discussion of eye contact is to use it as a model 
of how social roles create common knowledge. To that end, note that 
the following feature of eye contact explains how it generates 
common knowledge. In describing this feature, we focus on Alice, but 
the same comments hold for Bob, and the fact that what we say is true 
for both is the feature in question. The feature: Alice’s having her 
eyes directly in line with Bob’s is sufficient for her to know1 that she 
sees Bob, and her having her eyes directly in line with Bob’s is 
sufficient for her to know2 that Bob knows1 that Alice’s eyes are 
directly in line with his. Social roles give rise to common knowledge 
in the same way. 
B.  How Social Roles Generate Common Knowledge 
So what is the analogue of having eyes directly in line for social 
roles? An example helps. Imagine that a student, Roger, visits his 
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professor, Sarah, during her office hours. Roger presents himself in 
the role of a student; Sarah presents herself in the role of a professor. 
Their presentations of themselves in those roles is sufficient for Roger 
to know1 that Sarah will conform to the student/teacher norm, and it is 
sufficient for Roger to know2 that Sarah knows1 that they present 
themselves to each other in those roles. The same is true for Sarah: 
the role presentations are sufficient for Sarah to know1 that Roger will 
conform to the student/teacher norm, and it is sufficient for Sarah to 
know2 that Roger knows1 that the present themselves in the roles. 
To explain how this happens, we begin with sports stadium 
advertising. The game theorist Michal Chwe notes that, during a game 
in 1996, 
baseball fans at Cleveland’s Jacobs Field [looked] up to see an 
airplane pulling a banner advertising anonymous HIV testing. 
Obviously the irony here is the airing of such a sensitive issue as 
AIDS publicly and even festively on a bright sunny day at the 
ballpark. . . [The underlying purpose is that] I would be more 
likely to get an HIV test if I knew that doing so was not unusual, 
but I wouldn’t find this out through everyday conversation; at the 
ballpark, looking up at the plane, however, it is obvious to all that 
everyone is seeing the same thing.106
Thus, for everyone, seeing the sign was sufficient for knowing that 
anonymous HIV testing was available, and—because it was “obvious 
to all that everyone is seeing the same thing”—seeing the sign was 
sufficient for each person seeing it to know that everyone saw it, at 
least everyone who was paying minimal attention to what was 
happening above the stadium. These two features made it common 
knowledge among the “paying minimal attention” group that 
anonymous HIV testing was available. 
The resulting common knowledge comes from two factors: (1) 
Almost everyone knows that the banner is flying over the stadium, 
and (2) almost everyone knows that almost everyone knows that. (1) 
and (2) give rise to the infinite sequence of knowledge levels that 
constitute common knowledge that a banner is flying over the 
stadium. (1) and (2) make it a simple matter to get to the first two 
levels of knowledge.107
 106. CHWE, supra note 104, at 41. 
 107. We are following Davd Lewis. “[T]he basic idea behind Lewis’ argument is that for a 
set of agents, if a proposition A is publicly known among them and each agent knows that 
everyone can draw the same conclusion p from A that she can, then p is common 
knowledge.” Vanderschraaf & Sillari, supra note 105. The same idea underlies Stephen 
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Suppose, for example, Colin and Megan are sitting together in 
the stadium. Colin reasons this way at his first level of knowledge. “I 
know I see the banner, and I know that Megan does too. So we both 
know that a banner is flying over the stadium.” Megan reasons in the 
same way to her first-level conclusion that they both know a banner is 
flying over the stadium. 
At the second level, Colin reasons as follows: “I reasoned to my 
first-level conclusion from the fact the Megan knows that a banner is 
flying over the stadium to the conclusion that we both know that. 
Megan knows that I know that a banner is flying over the stadium, so 
she will have reasoned in the same way the to her first-level 
conclusion that we both know that a banner is flying over the 
stadium.” For Colin to reach that conclusion is for him to know that 
they know that a banner is flying over the stadium. Megan reasons in 
the same way to her conclusion that they both know that they know. 
Once they get to the second level, Colin and Megan reach the rest of 
the levels by reasoning about their reasoning at the levels below. 
Of course, flying banners over stadiums is not the only way to 
create situations in which “it is obvious to all that everyone is seeing 
[learning, apprehending] the same thing.”108 Education and 
acculturation also routinely provide a basis for common knowledge in 
the same way.109 In the United States, for example, a process of 
explicit and implicit instruction, discussion, and correction makes it 
obvious to everyone—at least those with a minimum of basic 
education—that everyone learns that George Washington was the first 
president of the United States. Thus, not only is it true that: (1) almost 
everyone in the United States learns that George Washington was the 
first president; it is also true that (2) almost everyone knows that 
almost everyone learns that. Social roles and associated informational 
norms generate common knowledge in this way. 
Consider the student/teacher norm. In the appropriate group 
(which includes at least students and teachers at large universities), 
education and acculturation result in everyone knowing that students 
and teachers conform to the student/teacher norm, and in everyone 
knowing that everyone knows that everyone is subject to that process 
of education and acculturation. So, not only do students and teachers 
Schiffer’s treatment of common knowledge (which he calls “mutual knowledge”).  STEPHEN
SCHIFFER, MEANING 32-35 (1973). Following CHWE, supra note 104, at 41, we add an account 
of how a proposition can become “publicly known.” 
 108. CHWE, supra note 104, at 41. 
 109. TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (2012). 
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know that students and teachers adhere to the student/teacher norm, 
they know that they know that. The result is common knowledge of 
conformity to the norm. 
Roger and Sarah, for example, get to the first level of knowledge 
as follows. Roger reasons: “I see us interacting as student and teacher. 
As a teacher, Sarah adheres to the student/teacher norm, and I know I 
adhere to that norm, so I conclude that we both conform to the norm.” 
Sarah reasons the same way about Roger to the conclusion that she 
knows that they both conform. So we have: 
Roger knows1 that they conform to the norm. 
Sarah knows1 that they conform to the norm. 
Roger and Sarah get to the second level reasoning about their 
first level reasoning. Roger reasons: “Sarah knows that I know 
students and teachers conform to the norm. So, at the first level, she 
will have reasoned from my knowing that to the conclusion that I 
know that we conform to the norm.” For Roger to reach that 
conclusion is for him to know2 that Sarah knows1 that they conform. 
Sarah reasons the same way about Roger and thus she know2 that he 
knows1 that they conform. So we have: 
Roger knows2 that Sarah knows1 that they conform to the norm. 
Sarah knows2 that Roger knows1 they conform to the norm. 
They get to the rest of the levels in the same way, by reasoning 
about their reasoning at the level below. As in the eye contact 
example, these attributions of reasoning do not characterize reasoning 
that Roger and Sarah actually produce. They characterize a capacity
they share. That capacity makes them transparent to each other as far 
as coordination under the student/teacher norm is concerned. They are 
capable of ruling out any relevant possibility of doubt or deception 
with regard to their conformity under the norm, so, as with eye 
contact, there is nowhere to hide, either inadvertently or by design. 
Their transparency is a form of trust. 
C.  Trust 
Our equation of transparency and trust may seem wrong. After 
all, isn’t it obvious that trust contrasts with knowledge? Isn’t trust a 
matter of having faith that something is true when you do not know 
that it is? Those points are obvious—on one traditional understanding 
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of trust.110 There is, however, another tradition that contrasts trust 
with the lack of a certain sort of knowledge, not with the lack of 
knowledge per se. The sociologist Barbara Misztal exemplifies this 
tradition when she remarks that “[t]rust always involves an element of 
risk resulting from our inability to monitor others’ behaviour, from 
our inability to have a complete knowledge about other people’s 
motivations.”111
We align ourselves with this second tradition. Our focus is on 
strangers whose only relevant knowledge of each is that they present 
themselves to each other in certain social roles. There is always “an 
element of risk resulting from our inability to monitor others’ 
behavior.” A person who appears to fulfill a certain role may not 
actually adhere to the norms associated with that role. 
When Roger enters Sarah’s office, she assumes that he belongs 
to the group students and teachers for whom it obvious that everyone 
learns that students and teachers conform to the student/teacher norm. 
She could be mistaken. Perhaps it is Roger’s first week at the 
university after growing up in a small town where his source of 
information about higher education was his cousin, George. George 
dropped out in his sophomore year and, embittered by the experience, 
convinced the credulous Roger that professors secretly pooled their 
information about students to use it all against them.112
To get common knowledge out of role presentations, you have to 
make background assumptions about the efficacy of processes of 
education and acculturation. People do routinely make those 
assumptions, as their thought and action shows. The result is a vision 
of others as transparent as far as coordination under norms goes. We 
treat this vision as a form of trust. We define the special notion of 
trust we will use as follows. You trust another person to conform to a 
norm if, based on the relevant role presentations, it is common 
knowledge between you that each of you will conform.113
Some may still wonder why we bother to talk about trust. 
Couldn’t we just talk about knowledge based on role presentations? 
110. See e.g., ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 21 (2000). 
 111. BARBARA MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES: THE SEARCH FOR THE BASES OF 
SOCIAL ORDER 18-19 (1996) (emphasis added). 
112. Id.
 113. There are a wide variety of treatments of trust and coordination. See, e.g, ANDREW H.
KYDD, TRUST AND MISTRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (3rd ed. 2007); KATHERINE
HAWLEY, TRUST: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 4–5 (2012); KAREN COOK, RUSSELL HARDIN
& MARGARET LEVI, COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST? (2007). 
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We could, but we would lose something essential. We would be 
overlooking the fact that our daily role-mediated dependencies on 
others occur within a web of associations and evaluations, a web that 
has the concept of trust at its center. Talk of trust keeps those 
association and evaluations at center stage. Talk of trust underscores 
the remarkable fact that people confidently predict how complete 
strangers will act based solely on the fact that they present themselves 
in a certain role. Role-based trust is a constant feature of daily life. As 
the Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom notes, 
As we go about our everyday life, we interact in a wide diversity of 
complex situations. Many of us face a morning and evening 
commute where we expect that others, who are traveling at great 
speeds, will observe the rules of the road. Our very lives depend on 
these expectations. Others depend on our own driving behavior 
conforming in general to locally enforced rules about speeding, 
changing lanes, and turn-taking behavior at intersections. Those of 
us who work in large organizations—universities, research centers, 
business firms, government offices—participate in a variety of 
team efforts. In order to do our own work well, we are dependent 
on others to do their work creatively, energetically, and 
predictably, and vice versa.114
Trust of strangers in the form of common-knowledge-created 
transparency is a pervasive feature of daily life. The investigative 
gaze undermines this trust. 
It does so by undermining the common knowledge on which 
trust (in our sense) depends. Role presentations serve as a basis for 
common knowledge in part because they provide a basis for knowing 
that others will conform to norms. As we argue it the next section, the 
investigative gaze subverts the ability of role presentation to generate 
the first-level knowledge that others will conform to norms. Without 
first-level knowledge, there is no reasoning to replicate to yield 
knowledge at higher levels. The consequence is that role-based 
common knowledge disappears. The transparency of common-
knowledge-based trust vanishes along with it, and people become 
opaque to each other. 
V. THE LOSS OF TRUST AND THE THREAT TO THE SELF
We explain how the investigative gaze undermines the capacity 
of role presentations to serve as a basis for knowing that others will 
 114. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 4 (2005). 
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conform, and we then consider the consequences for norm-enabled 
coordination. To fully evaluate those consequences, we turn to the 
threat the investigative gaze poses to the self. 
A.  How Surveillance Undermines Trust 
An example is helpful in explaining how the investigative gaze 
undermines the capacity of role presentations to serve as a basis for 
knowing that others will conform. Imagine Edward, a whistleblowing 
source with classified government information, contacts Glenn, a 
well-known investigative journalist. Glen assumes the government 
will turn its investigative gaze on his interactions with the source, and 
that other investigative journalists are, and believe they are, under 
surveillance. Those assumptions are correct,115 but their truth does not 
matter for the purposes of the example. What matters is the effect of 
journalists’ believing they are true. Specifically, is presenting yourself 
as a journalist still sufficient for other journalists to know that you 
would conform to the journalist norm given the power of today’s 
governmental investigative gaze? 
Perhaps not. The point of conforming to the norm is to ensure a 
politically independent press by refusing to disclose the identity of 
sources. The investigative gaze makes it extremely difficult to conceal 
the identity of a source even if a journalist refuses to disclose it, so the 
point of refusing to disclose disappears. 
In addition, surveillance can readily give the government 
evidence of a journalist’s communications with a source and of a 
journalist’s receiving and concealing classified or sensitive 
information. The consequences may include government harassment, 
imprisonment for refusal to disclose a source, and, in national security 
cases, prosecution under the Espionage Act.116
Against this background, Glen asks, “Will other journalists, most 
of whom are strangers to me, conform to the journalist norm? Can I 
predict based merely on their presentation of themselves as journalists 
that they will conform?” How can he confidently answer yes? 
Previously, a journalist’s role presentation was a reliable predictor of 
conformity when refusing to disclose a source’s identity effectively 
concealed the source’s identity. But it no longer is now when the 
government can easily focus its gaze on activities that were formerly 
115. See generally GREENWALD, supra note 90; SAGAR, supra note 91. We discuss the 
issues at some length in Sloan & Warner, supra note 49. 
116. See SAGAR, supra note 91, at 105, 154. 
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easy to conceal. Different people will act differently. Some may 
conform to express their allegiance to the ideal of a politically 
independent press. Some may conform because “that is what 
journalists do,” or for various other reasons. Others will not conform 
on the ground that doing so has lost its point and incurs increased 
risks.
For people he knows well, Glen may be able to assign some 
rough probability to his prediction of what they will do, but, in the 
case of strangers, Glen will not have enough information to do that. 
All he will know is that different people will react differently, and he 
will be unable to assign any even rough probability to whether they 
will conform or not. We will describe these cases as instances of 
uncertainty.117
This pattern repeats itself for other norms. In general, the main 
reason for conforming to informational norms is the selective control 
of the flow of information. The investigative gaze reduces, if it does 
not eliminate, the point of conforming by reducing, if not eliminating, 
the parties’ ability to conceal a wide range of information.118 In 
addition, being under the investigative gaze carries with it 
unpredictable consequences, and, in a wide range of cases, increases 
the risk of unwanted consequences, both known and unknown. 
Assume—for the moment—that people are aware of the reach 
and power of the investigative gaze. Then, different people will react 
differently, and in the case of strangers, one will not have enough 
information to assign any even rough probability to whether they will 
conform. One will be uncertain. It follows that, among strangers, role 
presentations are no longer sufficient for people to know that others 
will conform to norms. Common knowledge collapses, trust vanishes, 
and people become opaque. 
Grant, for the moment, that the loss of trust leads to a decline in 
coordination under informational norms. That would entail a decline 
 117. This technical use of “uncertainty” is standard in economics. See KEN BINMORE,
RATIONAL DECISIONS 35 (2011); OSTROM, supra note 114, at 49. 
 118. For a similar view, see Margot Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 9 
WASH. LAW REV. 1113 (2015); Margot Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: 
First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 UNIV. RICHMOND
LAW REV. 456 (2015). See also Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a 
Networked World, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 129–136 (2003), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/642611.642635; Valerian J. 
Derlega & Alan L. Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social Relationships, 33 J. SOC.
ISSUES 102–115 (1977); VALERIAN J. DERLEGA & ALAN L. CHAIKIN, SHARING INTIMACY:
WHAT WE REVEAL TO OTHERS AND WHY (1975). 
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in privacy in public, because privacy in public arises in significant 
part from coordination under informational norms. The decline in 
privacy in public carries with it a decline in the ability to realize the 
wide range of social roles that require a significant degree of privacy 
in public. Opportunities for self-realization wane significantly, and 
people lead impoverished lives compared to those they can still lead 
now.
Fortunately, at present, in a wide range of cases, people continue 
to coordinate under informational norms. Their coordination 
facilitates the privacy in public people need to realize social roles that 
depend on restricted flows of information. So our assumption that 
norm-enabled coordination declines may be wrong. One may also 
question our assumption that people know and understand the 
investigative gaze. 
Our point is that both assumptions are likely to become true in 
the near future. So, the threat of a serious loss of opportunities for 
self-realization, while it remains just a threat, is nonetheless an 
imminent one. Even if people do not understand the reach and power 
of the investigative gaze today, they are increasingly aware of 
surveillance and its effects.119 So turn the clock forward to the time 
when people are well aware of the investigative gaze. Once they are, 
role-based-common knowledge among strangers disappears, and 
strangers become opaque as the transparency of common-knowledge-
based trust vanishes. Will coordination under informational norms 
decline?
Perhaps but not necessarily. The loss of common knowledge 
leaves people uncertain about whether others will conform, and what 
people do when they are uncertain depends on how they value the 
relevant outcomes.120 If they value conformity enough, they will still 
conform. 
119. See PEW Research Center for the People & the Press July 2013 Political Survey, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER FOR PEOPLE & THE PRESS (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
questionnaires/7-26-13 NSA Topline for Release.pdf (Post-Snowden, knowledge of government 
surveillance is widespread. According to a 2013 PEW survey, “50% of Americans answered ‘a 
lot’ to ‘How much, if anything, have you heard about the government collecting information 
about telephone calls, e-mails and other online communications as part of efforts to monitor 
terrorist activity?’ Another 37% answered ‘a little.’ Totaling the percentages yields 87% with 
some knowledge of government surveillance and hence—possibly—some knowledge of their 
own complicity.). 
 120. We offer a game-theoretic model in support of this claim in Sloan & Warner, supra
note 49, at 393-402; Robert H Sloan & Richard Warner, The Harm in Merely Knowing: Privacy, 
Complicity, Surveillance, and the Self, 19 J. INTERNET LAW 3 (2015). 
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Consider a non-norm example first. Suppose that Victor prefers 
to attend the opera if Victoria attends as well, and prefers to stay 
home alone if she does not. He is uncertain whether she will attend. 
Whether Victor will go to the opera depends on how much he values 
the options relative to each other. If he values going to the opera 
highly enough, he will go even though he is uncertain whether she 
will. Conformity under informational norms is the same. A person 
will conform even in the glare of the investigative gaze if the person 
values the consequences of conformity sufficiently more than the 
consequences of non-conformity. So, if enough people value 
conformity highly enough, people may continue to coordinate under 
informational norms. The observable behavior will look the same as it 
does when common-knowledge-based trust leads parties to 
coordinate. What is going on, however, is very different. Trust allows 
strangers to coordinate knowing the other will. When people are 
uncertain whether others will conform, their conformity is the placing 
of a bet on an outcome to which they can assign no particular 
probability.
We think this is a plausible explanation of the current pattern of 
conformity to informational norms in the presence of the investigative 
gaze. As increasing awareness of surveillance undermines common 
knowledge, people will conform as long as they place a sufficiently 
high value on the coordination that results when both they and others 
conform.121 “Sufficiently high” is be high enough to make conformity 
a more attractive choice than non-conformity. In the journalist and 
source example this corresponds to the attitude, “The conformity of 
the community of journalists is so important to me that I will conform 
on the chance that others will conform.”122
In either case, if such conformity to informational norms in the 
presence of the modern investigative gaze persists for long enough, it 
is plausible people would eventually become accustomed to 
 121. Some may object that many people have not thought enough about surveillance and 
its consequences to be described as valuing conformity under surveillance more than non-
conformity under surveillance. Surely many, if not most, people use their smart phone, post on 
Facebook, and the like without thinking anything like, “Given surveillance, I still value the 
outcomes of norm-conformity more than non-conformity.” Our notion of valuing, however, 
extends to the cases in which one would explicitly rank conformity higher in value than non-
conformity if, under suitably ideal conditions, one were to explicitly consider what one valued. 
 122. People will also conform if they value what they get from their own conformity (no 
matter what others do) more than the outcomes that flow from non-conformity. In the journalist 
and source example, this would be the attitude, “I believe so strongly in the ‘journalists don’t 
disclose the identity of sources’ norm that I’m going to follow it regardless of both surveillance 
and other journalists’ behavior.” 
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effectively revealing a variety of different sorts of information to the 
investigative gaze and accept doing so as consistent with the selective 
disclosure required by various social roles. Role presentations would 
again become a reliable predictor of conformity to informational 
norms even in the presence of the investigative gaze, common 
knowledge would return and would bring with it the transparency of 
common-knowledge-based trust. The danger is that people will be too 
tolerant of the investigative gaze and embrace a world in which 
ubiquitous and penetrating surveillance both severely restricts 
opportunities for self-realization and imposes the undesirable political 
and social consequences outlined earlier. 
One countermeasure is obvious: restrict the reach and power of 
the investigative gaze. Privacy advocates and policy makers have 
repeatedly recommended and pursued that strategy. There is, 
however, a second and equally important countermeasure they have 
ignored: preserve and restore role-based common knowledge. 
Without it, strangers will remain opaque and opportunities for self-
realization will remain limited. 
The task is more urgent than it may seem. The amount of time 
available to carry out the task depends in part on how long norm-
enabled coordination continues under conditions of uncertainty. 
Under such conditions, coordinating is placing a bet on an outcome to 
which one can assign no particular probability. Coordination will 
continue as long as people value conformity sufficiently more than 
non-conformity. The instant peoples’ values change coordination 
collapses. Will people’s values change? 
That is not unlikely. The investigative gaze creates a threat to the 
self, and that threat may lead people to assign a large disvalue to the 
consequences of conformity. If enough people assign a large enough 
disvalue, people will value non-conformity over conformity, and 
conformity to informational norms cease. Interaction among people 
would not cease, of course. It would still be true that “[a]s we go 
about our everyday life, we interact in a wide diversity of complex 
situations,”123 but, without coordination under informational norms, 
the character of those interactions would profoundly change. One 
possibility is a world in which an 
implicit bargain. . . is offered to citizens: pose no challenge and 
you have nothing to worry about. Mind your own business, and 
support or at least tolerate what we do, and you’ll be fine. Put 
 123. OSTROM, supra note 114, at 4. 
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differently, you must refrain from provoking the authority that 
wields surveillance powers if you wish to be deemed free of 
wrongdoing. This is a deal that invites passivity, obedience, and 
conformity. The safest course, the way to ensure being “left 
alone,” is to remain quiet, unthreatening, and compliant.124
We conclude by examining the threat to the self and considering 
how likely it is that it will undermine coordination under 
informational norms. 
B.  The Threat to the Self 
Othello stands as a warning of the potential threat to the self in 
the “I see” of the investigative gaze. Othello’s “I’ll see” results in a 
“data profile” of Desdemona that wrongly represents her as 
unfaithful. Desdemona’s protestations of faithfulness are unavailing. 
They would have been effective at the beginning of the play when 
Desdemona’s presentation of herself as a loving spouse prompted 
Othello to call her his “soul’s joy,” but Othello’s “I see” destroys his 
trust in that role presentation, and, in a display of the destructive 
power of the combination of loss of trust and acontextual 
representations, he kills Desdemona and then himself. 
The trust-undermining investigative gaze subjects people to a 
similar misinterpretation through the use of acontextual data. The 
ubiquity of the investigative gaze entails a loss of control over how 
you appear, and the heavy reliance on acontextual data means the way 
you appear to others does not accurately reflect the way you are. That 
inaccurate representation nonetheless determines to a great extent the 
risk and benefits that come your way. You contribute to this 
misrepresentation whenever you conform to informational norms. 
Conformity has always entailed selectively revealing information. 
Today, however, even selectively revealing information entails 
revealing that information to the ubiquitous investigative gaze. 
Will people come to place a high enough disvalue on constantly 
playing into their own misrepresentation that it outweighs the value 
they place on conformity to informational norms? The metaphors we 
considered earlier suggest they should, even if they do not.125 They 
 124. GREENWALD, supra note 90, at 195. We discuss possible futures in Sloan& Warner, 
supra note 49, at 403-08. 
 125. For additional considerations, see JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2001) (emphasizing the undesirability of acontextual 
characterizations of people). ONORA O’NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST: THE BBC REITH
LECTURES 64 (2002) (emphasizing the need to trust “with good judgment”). 
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suggest that pervasive surveillance dehumanizes people. They 
become “mere algorithm fodder,”126 “nodes of information 
production,”127 and puppets manipulated through “invisible 
threads.”128 They are “forced. . . into the undivided coherency of 
statistics. . . [into] a positive absorption into the transparency of 
computers, which is something worse than alienation.”129
The metaphors raise questions. Will people see the pervasive 
presence of the investigative gaze as dehumanizing? Will they as a 
result assign a high disvalue to exposing themselves through norm-
enabled coordination to the distorting use of acontextual data? And 
will that disvalue be great enough to outweigh the value they place on 
conformity to norms? 
The fact that people still routinely conform to informational 
norms shows that currently the answer to the second question at least 
is “No.” The answers to both questions could change to a clear “Yes,” 
but it seems unlikely that the change would occur for all
informational norms. 
The reason is that different consequences are associated with 
conformity to different types of norms. Conforming to the journalist 
norm can expose you to government harassment and prosecution. 
Compare this with the student/teacher norm in an institution that uses 
one of the increasingly popular student tracking programs like 
Jenzabar.130 Jenzabar offers “a 360 degree view of each student—
from academic performance and extracurricular engagement to 
financial aid and demographic information—providing you with deep 
insights into potential risk factors and probabilities of success.”131 The 
risk for a conforming students is that they will be represented (or 
misrepresented) in ways inconsistent with choices they have made 
about how to pursue their self-realization. The risk, while serious, is 
not as grave as prosecution for failure to disclose a source or the 
possession and use of classified information. 
 126. PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 198. 
 127. DEIBERT, supra note 69. 
 128. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 70. 
 129. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 71, at 210. Alienation, a sense of separation from others, 
requires a sense oneself as separate and autonomous. Peoples’ “absorption” into their digital 
profiles denies them even that bittersweet solace. 
 130. JENZABAR, http://www.jenzabar.com (last visited April 5, 2016). 
131. Jenzabar Retention, JENZABAR (2013), http://www.jenzabar.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/Jenzabar_Retention_Brochure_web_2.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
In general, the degree of disvalue people assign to conformity 
under norms will vary as the severity of the risks of conformity vary, 
and those risks will vary with the type of norm. The result is that the 
negative effect of people’s perception of increased disvalue on 
coordination spreads across a spectrum from “extreme disvalue” to 
“minimal disvalue.”
The more people’s responses gravitate toward the “extreme 
disvalue” end, the more norm-enabled coordination collapses. This is 
more than just an abstract possibility. There are a number of examples 
arguably moving toward the “extreme disvalue” end. The journalist 
norm and the student/teacher norm are cases in point, as we have 
argued elsewhere.132 Other examples include norms involved in hiring 
and retention, health insurance, the extension of credit, direct 
marketing, price discrimination, and news reporting.133
The solution is to preserve and restore role-based common 
knowledge. That task has not been on the radar of either public policy 
makers or privacy advocates, but it very much should be. 
 132. Warner and Sloan, supra note 84; Sloan and Warner, supra note 49. 
133. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
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